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By Letter of 21 October 1983, the President of the Council of the 
European Communities requested the European Parliament to deliver an opinion, 
pursuant to Article 43 of the EEC Treaty, on the proposals from the Commission 
of the European Communities to the Council for regulations amending 
I. Regulation No. 974/71/EEC, particularly in respect of the system of 
neutral margins and the gradual dismantlement of the monetary 
compensatory amounts applying to certain agricultural and processed 
products; 
II. Regulation No. 2773/75/EEC laying down the rules for calculating the levy 
and the sluice-gate price for eggs; 
III. Regulation amending Regulation No. 2778/75/EEC laying down rules for 
calculating the levy and the sluice-gate price for poultry meat. 
On 27 October 1983, the President of the European Parliament referred 
these proposals to the Committee on Agriculture as the committee responsible 
and to the Committee on Budgets for an opinion. 
At its meeting of 3-4 November 1983, the Committee on Agriculture 
appointed Mr P. MARCK rapporteur. 
The committee examined the Commission's proposals and the draft report at 
its meetings of 22-23 November 1983, 25-26 January 1984 and 1-2 February 1984. 
At the Last meeting, the committee decided by 30 votes to 4, with 3 
abstentions to recommend to Parliament that it approved the Commission's 
proposals with the amendments below. 
The Commission has not stated its position on these amendments. 
The Committee on Agriculture then adopted the motion for a resolution as 
a whole by 30 votes to 4 with 3 abstentions. 
•• The following took part in the vote: Mr Curry, chairman; Mr Fruh, 
Mr Colleselli and Mr Delatte, vice-chairmen; Mr Marek, rapporteur; 
Mr Barbagli (deputizing for Mr Diana>, Mr Blaney, Mr Bocklet, Mrs Castle, 
Mr Cottrell (deputizing for Mr Battersby), Mr Dalsass, Mr Desouches 
(deputizing for Mr Eyraud), Mr Gatto, Mr Goerens (deputizing for 
Mr. s. Martin>, Mr Helms, Mr Herman (deputizing for Mr Clinton>, Mr Hord, 
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Mr Jurgens, Mr ~aloyannis, Mr Kaspereit, Mr Kirk, Mr Ligios, Mr Maffre-8auge, 
Mr Mertens, Mr ~- Nielsen, Mr d10rmesson, Mr Papapietro, Mr Pranchere, 
Mr Provan, Ms Q~in, Mr Simmonds, Mr Stella (deputizing for Mr Tolman>, 
Mr Sutra, Mr Th~reau, Mr Vernimmen, Mr Vgenopoulos and Mr Vitale. 
The present! report was tabled on 2 February 1984. 
The opinion of the Committee on Budgets is attached. 
' 
I The deadline for the tabling of amendments to this report appears in the 
draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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The Commi1tee on Agriculture hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following ~mendments to the Commission's proposals and motion for a 
resolution wit~ explanatory statement: 
Proposal I 
; Preamble and first to fifth recitals unchanged 
Amendment No. 1 
Sixth recital 
Whereas adjusting the representative 
rates could le+d to a drop in incomes 
in some "ember1States; whereas 
provision shou~d be made for 
offsetting thi~ via the granting of 
i 
degressive amo~nts of aid over a 
limited periodlof time, the actual 
details of whiqh will be decided by 
the Council inldue course; 
Sixth recital 
Whereas adjusting the representative 
rates could lead to a drop in incomes 
in some "ember States; whereas 
provision should be made for 
offsetting this via the granting of 
degressive amounts of aid, the actual 
details of which will be decided by 
the Council in due course; 
Seventh to tenth recitals unchanged 
Articles 1 to 3 unchanged 
Amendment No. ~ 
Article 4 
This Regulation shall enter into 
force on 1 Apr1l 1984. 
Proposals 11 aqd Ill unchanged 
WP0561E 
OR.NE. 
Article 4 
This Regulation shall enter into 
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A 
"OTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
closing the procedure for consultation of the European Parliament on the 
proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for 
I. a regulation amending Regulation No. 974/71 CEEC>, in particular in 
respect of the system of neutral margins and the gradual dismantlement of 
the monetary compensatory amounts applying to certain agricultural and 
processed products; 
II. a regulation amending Regulation No. 2773/75/EEC laying down rules for 
calculating the levy and the sluice-gate price for eggs; 
III. a regulation amending Regulation No. 2778/75/EEC laying down rules for 
calculating the levy and the sluice-gate price for poultrymeat. 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposals from the Commission of the European 
Communities to the Council CCO"C83) 586 final and C~C83> 635 final>, 
-having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 43 of the EEC 
Treaty <Doc. 1-940/83>, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and the opinion 
of the Committee on Budgets (Doc. 1-1370/83>, 
- having regard to the result of the votes on the Commission's proposals, 
A. recalling its resolution of 18 November 1983 on the Commission's new 
proposals for the common agricultural policy (C0"(83) 500 final>, in 
particular paragraph 22 (1), 
B. recalling the final communique of the European Council of 4 and 
5 December 1978 and the •gentlemen's agreement• of March 1978 concerning 
MCAs, 
(1) PE 87.557 
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C. having reg~rd to the report by the Court of Auditors on the sound 
financial management of the European Communities <1>, in which the Court 
called fori the abolition of MCAs, 
D. whereas MC~s, originally intended as a temporary instrument to reduce the 
economic ;~pact of fluctuations in the currencies of the Member States, 
have of ne~essity acquired a permanent character because of the lack of 
progress tpwards monetary union, 
I 
E. whereas th~ lack of harmonization in economic and monetary policy 
continues ~o place a severe burden on the economy generally, and on the 
i 
CAP in par~icular, and whereas the causes lie outside the agricultural 
sector, 
F. whereas MC~s distort the terms of competition between the Member States as 
I 
regards production costs by giving a permanent advantage to 
strong-currency countries while, by the same token, penalizing weak 
currency c~untries, 
G. furthermort, MCAs disrupt intra-Community trade by creating artificial 
exchange rates detrimental to countries with negative MCAs, 
' 
H. whereas th' administrative burden of MCAs is borne by countries with 
I 
negative M¢As, which constitutes an additional disadvantage for such 
countries, I 
I. whereas, b'cause of the complexity of the rules for applying them, MCAs 
are a potemtial source of fraud under the EAGGF, 
J. whereas, given these considerations, the progressive abolition of MCAs 
should be ~ primary objective of the Community, 
I 
K. whereas, h~wever, the abolition of MCAs should not penalize farmers in 
countries ~ith positive MCAs, 
L. whereas MC4s result from the absence of genuine economic and monetary 
union between the Member States of the Community, 
<1> OJ No. C 1~87, 24 October 1983, paragraphs 2.3.18 and 2.3.19 
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M. whereas a first step in this direction would be the participation of all 
Member States in the European Monetary System, in which the ECU should 
play a more important part, 
1. Considers that the Commission's proposals represent a useful contribution 
towards resolving the problem of phasing out MCAs; 
<A> Proposal I 
2. Welcomes the Commission's proposal to abolish existing MCAs within a 
period of not more than two years, on the understanding that: 
<a> this does not red~ce earnings in countries with positive MCAs in view 
of the rise in ECU prices, 
(b) the abolition of negative MCAs can be accelerated at the request of 
the country concerned and with the agreement of the Council in 
countries with negative MCAs; 
3. Calls for the dismantling of new MCAs following a strict timetable, in 
accordance with the procedure specified by the Commission in its proposal, 
on the understanding that these MCAs can be dismantled at a faster rate, 
with the agreement of the Council, for Member States that so request; 
4. Welcomes the provision included by the Commission for Member States to 
grant compensatory aid where the abolition of positive MCAs would 
adversely afect the earnings of the farmers concerned; requests, however, 
that such aid should be degressive and should not be granted for more than 
three marketing years, as recommended by the Commission; 
5. Rejects, on the other hand, any proposal only to allow the creation of 
negative MCAs in future, for such a proposal 
<a> would place the entire burden of sacrifice on weak-currency countries, 
which would be contrary to the spirit of the Community, 
(b) would reduce the role of the ECU within the EMS, since such a solution 
would imply the creation of a •green' ECU; 
WP0561E 
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(8) Proposals II rnd III 
I 
i 
6. Hopes that t~e technical modifications recommended by the Commission would 
have no advense economic impact on those sectors affected by the MCA 
changes, sue~ as in the pork production sector, and that in particular 
there should lbe no adverse effects on processed products as a result of 
the planned dhanges in derivation coefficients, 
I 
(C) Other consid,rations 
7. Calls on theiCouncil and Commission in accordance with the Council 
I 
resolution ot 1971 on the gradual implementation of economic and monetary 
union to take concrete steps at long last to achieve in the medium term 
convergence ffn national economic developments which would lead to a stable 
' 
exchange rat~ position; 
8. Urges, there~ore, the United Kingdom and Greece to participate in the 
European Mon~tary System in order to achieve this aim; 
9. Instructs itls President to forward to the Council and Commission, as 
Parliament'~ opinion, the Commis~ion's proposal as voted by Parliament and 
the corresp9nding resolution. 
WP0561E 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. On 7 October 1983, the Commission submitted to the Council a series of pro-
posed amendments to the system of monetary compensatory amounts <MCAs>. The 
intention is: 
- to introduce into basic Regulation <EEC> No. 974/71 rules for the pro-
gressive dismantling of MCAs, the principle of which was included in the 
Commission's 28 July 1983 proposals on the common agricultural policy 
(COM(83) 500 final); 
- to modify the rules governing the calculation of MCAs for the various 
categories of products as well as the system of neutral margins in accord-
ance with the undertaking given by the Commission when the agricultural 
prices were fixed for the 1983/84 marketing year. The aim of the changes 
proposed by the Commission is to limit the application of MCAs to the 
amount strictly necessary to offset temporary differences in price levels 
between the Member States and prevent disruption of intervention mechanisms 
and trade as a result of those price differences. 
2. Before examining the Commission's proposals, we shall review: 
- the origin of MCAs, 
-the conclusions drawn by the Commission in an earlier study of the economic 
effects of the agri-monetary system, 
- and lastly, the positions adopted by the Com~unity bodies on the subject. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF MCAs 
3. Monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) were first introduced in 1969 following 
the devaluation of the French Franc1 and the revaluation of the German Mark 2 
1 Regulation <EEC) No. 1586/69, OJ No. L 202, 12.8.1969, p. 1 
2 Regulation <EEC) No. 2464/69, OJ No. L 312, 12.12.1969, p. 4 
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in order to m$intain the system of common prices which had been introduced 
for the 1967148 marketing year. The amounts were fixed and were to apply 
for a limitediperiod. 
4. With the intrpduction of floating exchange rates for the German Mark and 
the Dutch Gui~der in M9y 1971, a new system of MCAs was introduced by 
Council Regul,tion <EEC> No. 974/71 on certain-measures of market policy to 
be taken in agriculture following the temporary widening of the margins of 
fluctuation fqr the currencies of certain Member States1• Pursuant to the 
final recitaljof this regulation, 'The compensatory amounts <were to> be 
limited to th~ amounts strictly necessary to compensate the incidence of 
the monetary ~easures on the prices of basic products covered by intervention 
arrangements ~nd it <was> appropriate to apply them only in cases where this 
incidence wou~d lead to difficulties'. MCAs were thus to be a temporary 
feature since !they were designed to offset the temporary widening of the 
margins of flyctuation for the currencies of certain Member States. 
5. With the gene~alized floating of the currencies of the Member States, and 
in the absence! for various reasons of any desire on the part of the Member 
States to adj~st the representative (or 'green') rates which were introduced 
in 1973 for th~ new Member States and extended in March 1975 to the original 
I Member States,: MCAs have taken on a permanent character. This would not be 
so serious if lit did not result in the distortion of the conditions of pro-
duction and t~e trade flows between the Member States and, hence, in the 
undermining o~ the unity of the co•on agricultural market. 
6. It is for the !purpose of restoring that unity that the Commission has on 
several occasi~ns submitted proposals to the Council to abolish MCAs. But 
no action has peen taken on those proposals. 
7. Having failed Ito bring about their abolition, the Commission has turned to 
technical meas~res to mitigate some of the adverse economic effects the 
agri-monetary ~ystem has for importers and exporters alike. Regulation <EEC) 
2 ' No. 1608/74 , ~hich introduced an equity clause, is one such example. 
1 I OJ No. L 106, 121.5.1971, p. 1 
2 170, I 38 OJ No. L 27i.6.1974, p. 
I 
' 
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8. Lastly, the Commission has preferred to reduce or abolish MCAs when sub-
mitting its agricultural price proposals to the Council. Reference may 
be made to the most recent report on the subject, the report by Mr Mouchel 
(Doc. 1-1325/82) on agricultural prices for the 1983/84 marketing year. 
9. Although this method has the advantage of being pragmatic - it is the only 
one to have been accepted by the Council - it by no means resolves the 
basic problem of the economic effects of a system that has taken on a 
permanent character, as can be seen from the annex attached. 
For the week 30 January-5 February 1984, MCAs were as follows: 
Germany 
milk 
cereals 
+ 10.8X 
: + 10.3X 
other products : + 9.8X 
United Kingdom 
+ 7.6X 
Netherlands 
milk 6.6X 
cereals 6.2X 
other products 5.8X 
Denmark 
+1% 
III. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MCAs 
Greece 
- 4.5X 
France 
wine 
milk 
pigmeat 
ox 
- 3.4X 
ox 
other products - 4.4X 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy 
ox 
10. On 10 February 1978, the Commission submitted to the Council a communication 
on the economic effects of the agri-monetary system CCOM<78) 20 final>. As 
its communication aroused considerable interest in the Council, the Commission 
decided to submit an updated version on 14 March 1979 CCOMC79) 11 final> in 
which it states that 'generally speaking, the figures obtained since the 
previous publication have not invalidated but, in most cases, have provided 
further justification for the earlier comments, thus confirming the 
- 12 - PE 87.601 /fin. 
Commission's view that the present agri-monetary system must be dismantled 
'dl ! 'bl I 1 h h h d l • l ld as rap1 y as poss1 e • Even t oug t ese ocuments are re at1ve y o , 
they merit car~ful consideration since the conclusions reached in them are 
still entirelyj valid. 
11. The Commissiory asserts in its communication that 'the use of green rates 
different froml the market rates has broken the unity of the common agri-
cultural market' and that the effects of such a rupture 'become pernicious 
as soon as it is prolonged beyond the minimum time limit required for adapt-
ation to the ~ew situation• 2• 
The Commissio~ points out for instance that 3 
(a) 'Member S~ates have sometimes attempted to counteract, by national aids 
for produqers, those effects of the agri-monetary system which they felt 
to be adv~rse', 
(b) 'difficul~ies have been caused by frauds against the agri-monetary system' 
(c) 'when MCA~ were abolished in the dJM wheat/pasta sector, pasta production 
tended to1become concentrated in Italy rather than the other Member 
! 
States' • ' 
12. The Commissior continues its analysis in an unequivocal fashion, even though 
it tries to ttmper its comments somewhat. 'It is difficult to deduce from 
the above facts that the agri-monetary situation has been entirely respons-
ible for any ~iven production trend. However, it is undeniable that it has 
had an effectj on certain branches of production, e.g. by altering the relation 
ship between producer prices and intermediate consumer prices. This influence 
seems to have! been particularly marked where producers reacted to prices, 
where market prices were close to intervention prices, where the price gaps 
I 
between Membe~ States remained wide for some time and where producers expectec 
the discrepan~ies to continue• 4• 
1 COM(79) 11 fiinal - Introduction 
2 COM<78) 20 fi~al, p. 2, paragraph 1 
~ COM(78> 20 fi~al, p. 8, paragraph 17 
COM(78) 20 final, p. 10, paragraph 18 
I 
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13. The effect of MCAs has in fact been felt at several levels. It is interest-
ing to note for instance, in the case of exports of dairy products from 
Germany and France to Italy, how MCAs have changed the traditional pattern 
of intra-Community trade. 
In 1968, Italy imported 1,300 tonnes of milk and cream from Germany and 
2,400 tonnes from France. Things changed in 1970, after the introduction 
of the first monetary compensatory amounts, and in 1982 Italy imported 
1,466,500 and 291,400 tonnes of milk and cream respectively from those 
countries. 
14. Turning to soft wheat, it may be noted that the United Kingdom's share in 
intra-Community trade has risen sharply since 1980, when it started to receive 
positive MCAs. In 1979, its share was in line with preceding years - 2.4X. 
In 1980, it rose to 17.1% and continued to remain high: 13.2% in 1981 and 
20.6% in 1982. The same applies to barley. 
15. As for sugar, it may be seen that Germany's share more than quadrupled 
(from 5.1% to 21.9%) from 1971 to 1982 while that of France and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) fell (from about 71X and 20X to 42X and 
10X respectively). 
16. As regards beef, Germany's share of intra-Community trade more than doubled 
from 1971 to 1982 (from 9.6% to 24%), whereas Ireland's share dropped from 
41.6% to 13.7%. The other Member States by and large maintained their 
positions. 
17. As regards pigmeat, the most spectacular gains on the Community market were 
made by the Netherlands, which increased its share form 29.6% in 1971 to 
40X in 1982. Over the same period, the BLEU registered a significant drop 
(from 23.6% to 16.3%), as did, to a lesser extent, Denmark <from 29.7% to 
25.8X> and France (from 4.7% to 2.5X>. 
In volume, Dutch exports to the other Member States rose from 504,695 tonnes 
in 1974 to 943,250 tonnes in 1982. BLEU exports showed little growth, rising 
from 301,643 tonnes to 383,969 tonnes over the same period. The same applies 
to the other Member States. The United Kingdom, with a fairly low export 
volume, increased exports from 25,007 tonnes in 1979, when it was still 
receiving negative MCAs, to 46,192 tonnes in 1980, when it began to receive 
positive MCAs. 
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In Italy for *xample there was a noticeable increase in pigmeat imports 
from the Neth,rlands from 1970 to 1982 at the expense of France, Ireland 
and to a less'r extent Denmark. Germany has slightly increased its share 
while the BLE~ has held its position. 
18. It may be intfresting to look at the share of products subject to MCAs in 
the value of ~gricultural output. For 1981, the percentages are as follows: 
Germany : 183.6~ Luxembourg 93.7~ 
France :I 78.4% United Kingdom 77 .5~ 
! 
!taly :I 57.0% Ireland 89.3% 
Netherlands :1 69.9% Denmark 85.4~ 
Belgium :177.1% Greece 40.1~ 
These figure~ illustrate the advantage, or disadvantage, of MCAs for each 
country, depe~ding on whether they are positive or negative. A country 
with negativ~ MCAs is at less of a disadvantage the lower the percentage 
of output su~ject to MCAs, but this means at the same time that it does 
not benefit ~rom CAP mechanisms for products given maximum protection by 
the CAP. 
19. Generally sp~aking, Germany has increased its share of intra-Community 
trade in agrilcultural products at the expense of countries with negative 
MCAs. 
Although it 9annot be claimed that this trend is due to MCAs alone - greater 
productivity land better organization of producers having led to a more dynamic 
export polic~ - MCAs have undoubtedly had an impact. 
In fact, it 1s clear that the combination of various favourable factors has 
a multiplier ieffect: if exports to another country are already structurally 
well establi~hed, the introduction of positive MCAs will accelerate this 
favourable tJend. The existence of substantial positive MCAs over a long 
period therefore represents an unquestionable advantage for this Member 
State's expo~ts. 
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20. If we consider current production costs, it is noticeable that MCAs provide 
a further advantage to countries with positive MCAs in that their farmers, 
who benefit from a strong currency <Lower import costs>, also reap the ad-
vantages of a higher price Level than in countries with depreciated 
currencies. 
21. The most typical example of the deterioration of the competitive position 
of some producers is to be found in the pigmeat sector1• 
22. Let us consider one example cited by the Commission in its 1978 study: the 
pigmeat market in the United Kingdom <which at that time had positive MCAs> 
experienced an increase in the proportion of imports from the Netherlands 
and Germany (both countries with positive MCAs) and a decrease in those 
from Denmark (where MCAs were in general abolished immediately). Denmark 
sent mainly bacon sides and meat preserves to the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands mainly L~rd, cuts of bacon and preparations such as tinned hams. 
The Netherlands then took a larger share of the bacon and meat preserves 
market while its relative share of the market in Lard fell, as did that of 
France, to the advantage of Germany (a country with positive MCAs) and, to 
some extent, of Italy <for reasons other than MCAs alone, since Italy has 
always had negative MCAs). 
23. According to the Commission; the reasons for the changes in trade flows 
at that time could have been: 
<a> differences in the composition of animal feed as between Member States; 
(b) the poor alignment of green rates in the United Kingdom which, together 
with the rate of inflation in that Member State, had placed British 
producers in a difficult situation. 
<The situation in the United Kingdom has since changed radically because it 
has had positive MCAs now for several years whereas previously its negative 
MCAs had been over the 40 point mark). 
On the other hand, (a) above remains valid, and in the case of factory farming 
products such as pigmeat and poultry, whose profit margins are very low, MCAs 
1 COM(78) 20 final, Annex C, p. 5 
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24. 
I 
I 
can have a bons~derable impact on the cost of production factors and thus 
benefit couhtri~s with positive MCAs to the detriment of the others. 
Another illlustrlative example is Greece. Before accession, it imported 18% of 
. i 
its meat f1om ~he Community. Of this 18%, the BLEU's share was 25% whereas 
the NetherUand~ and Germany held only a minor share of the market. After 
accession, limp~rts from the Community increased considerably but the BLEU's 
share dropped to 10.6%, in 1982, whereas the Netherlands and Germany increased 
their sharJ toi41% and 19%, respectively. 
25. Finally, t~ co~clude this survey, it should be recalled that MCAs have pro-
vided an ifcentive for fraud and there is nothing to suggest that the situatior 
will change. One example of this is the trade in live animals between Ireland 
and Northern Ireland before the Commission took the measures needed to combat 
fraud 1• B~twe~n 1974 and 1977 (first three quarters>, the control authorities 
detected 2~5 ;~regularities connected with MCAs, including 196 in the beef 
and veal srct~r and 22 in the pigmeat sector, amounting tO a total Of 5.3 m U.i 
This is by no ~eans surprising as the regulation on MCAs is highly complicated 
and some dfal~rs have found loopholes in it that they can exploit. Reference 
may also b!e m~de in this connection to the third report by the Special 
Committee ~f ~nquiry on beef and veal 2 which deals with irregularities con-
nected wi~h ·~ccession' compensatory amounts and MCAs. 
I I 
26. All theselexarples prove that a way must be found of ending the pernicious 
effects of th~ MCA system. Although MCAs are acceptable in the short term 
and may frcil~tate the functioning of the CAP, in the long term they produce 
economic ~ffe~ts incompatible with a common market and threaten its very 
existence~ They must therefore be dismantled. 
IV. 
27. 
POSITIONS! AD9PTED BY THE COMMUNITY BODIES 
! 
I , 
The study ca~ried out by the Commission is in itself an argument in favour 
. I 
of abolisjhin~ MCAs, and its new proposal is an attempt finally to get the 
Council io a~cept an institutionalized system for dismantling them. 
I 
But beforie c9nsidering this mechanism in detail, it is worth recalling 
some of Jhe ~ositions adopted by the other Community bodies. 
I 
2 COM(78) 20 fina~, Annex c, p. 8 COM<76) 3701finfl, pp. 59 to 76 
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28. To take merely the most striking examples, in its opinion 1 on agricultural 
prices for the 1980/81 marketing year, the European Parliament called for: 
(a) the abolition of existing positive MCAs within four years; 
(b) the abolition of existing negative MCAs within two years; 
(c) the abolition of new MCAs within one year, following a timetable drawn 
up by the Commission at the time of their introduction; 
(d) Member States who wished to do so, to be able to dismantle their MCAs 
more quickly. 
Similarly, in its opinion2 on agricultural prices for the 1983/84 marketing 
year, the European Parliament called for negative MCAs to be totally abolished 
and positive MCAs reduced in connection with the agricultural price increases 
recorded in the countries directly concerned. 
It also felt that complete economic and monetary union was a prerequisite 
for restoring the unity of the market on a real and lasting basis. Meanwhile 
United Kingdom and Greek participation in the EMS would be a first step to-
wards more coherent monetary union between the Member States. 
These two opinions make it very clear that the European Parliament is in 
favour of abolishing MCAs. 
29. In its report 3 on the Commission's proposals concerning the CAP <COM(83) 
500 final>, the Committee on Agriculture recalled the need to abolish MCAs 
in order to attain a common market and have real common prices. It even 
felt that existing MCAs should be dismantled within two years. 
30. The European Council meeting in Brussels on 4 and 5 December 1978, which led 
to the creation of the European monetary system <EMS) adopted a resolution, 
one paragraph of which referred to MCAs 4: 'the European Council stresses 
1 
the importance of henceforth avoiding the.creation of permanent MCAs and 
progressively reducing present MCAs in order to re-establish the unity of 
prices of the common agricultural policy, giving also due consideration to 
price policy'. 
OJ No. C 97, 21.4.1980, p. 33 paras. 103-105; Doc. 1-37/80- Rapporteur: 
2 Mr Delatte 
3 OJ No. C 104, 26.4.1982- Doc. 1-1325/82- Rapporteur: Mr Mouchel 
4 Doc. 1-987/83 - Rapporteur: Mr Curry Bulletin of the European Communities No. 12 - 1978, p. 12 
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31 . This reJolu~ion more or Less reiterated the Commission communication to the 
Europea~ Co~ncil of 4 and 5 December 1978 on the future development of the 
common ~gridultural policy 1 in which the Commission welcomed the introducti< 
of the ~uroRean monetary system <EMS> and urged the European Council 'to 
agree t~at ~he Community should dismantle sy~tematically all existing monet; 
compens~torx amounts once the European monetary system had been fully 
established:and became effective, taking account, where necessary, of com-
pensati1ns ~o producers or consumers'. 
32. The 'genfle~en's agreement' entered into by the Council in March 1979 Laid 
down a p:roc~dure for reducing MCAs 2• 
I r 
The new ~CAs introduced in the two years following the entry into force of 
the EMS )wer~ to be reduced in two stages, with effect from the beginning 
of the ~irs~ and second marketing years respectively following the decision 
on farm [pri~es taken after the introduction of these amounts. 
These rqduc~ions were not to Lead to a drop in prices in national currencie 
or a rise i~ these prices which could cause difficulties for the economy of 
the Mem~er $tate in question. During the period covering these two stages, 
the inctease in common prices would be used mainly to dismantle the positiv 
MCAs. the ~ouncil also affirmed its determination to reduce existing MCAs 
progressively so as to restore the unity of the common farm prices, taking 
due acctuntiof the prices policy. It was envisaged that this progressive 
reduction could be accelerated on the initiative of the Member State concer 
I 
33. At the ~uropean Council in Stuttgart from 17-19 June 19833, the Court of 
Auditorf wa~ asked to submit a report on the soundness of the financial 
management bf th~ European Communities. In its report, the Court of Audit< 
is scat~ingl in its criticism of the agri-monetary system. Its critique 
deserves to be quoted in fulL 4: 
I 
'The functioning of all the markets is affected by the monetary compensato1 
amounts( <MC~s>, whose continued existence has had Lasting and now familiar 
effects 1 on the very structure of European agriculture. But it is usually 
overloo~ed that: 
~Bulletin of)theiEuropean Communities No. 11 - 1978, pp. 131-132 
3 Doc. 1-1325)82/$ - paragraph 36 
4 Bulletin of the European Communities No. 6 - 1983, p. 20 
OJ No. C 28t, 2f October 1983, paragraphs 2.3.18 and 2.3.19 
I 
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(a) the MCAs involve a system of collecting or paying a total amount of one 
to two thousand million ECU per year; 
Cb) this system greatly encourages speculation and/or fraud, but it is very 
difficult to control without excessive restraints at frontiers, including 
the internal frontiers of the Community; 
(c) the net budgetary cost has varied over recent years, according to the 
speed with which the 'green' currencies have adapted to the flu~tuations 
of the real currencies, between the levels of 700 to 800 million ECU in 
1977 to 1979 and 200 to 300 million ECU in 1980 to 1982.' 
'The only valid solution to the various aspects of the problem of the MCAs 
is the introduction of a system of automatic and accelerated phasing out. 
The constraints inherent in such a process would in turn be a burden on all 
the other agricultural policy decisions and in particular the annual decisions 
on prices, but would, on this occasion, arise from an attempt to return to 
a single market.' 
34. It is undeniable that MCAs have been considerably reduced in the framework 
of the EMS since the maximum difference between positive and negative MCAs, 
which was as high as SO points, has been reduced by between 10 and 15 points 
since the creation of the EMS. Nevertheless, uncertainties still exist in that 
two Member States, the United Kingdom and Greece, are not in the EMS. More-
over, Germany has for years benefited from positive 'structural' MCAs of 
the order of 10 points. 
35. At the European Council in Stuttgart from 17 to 19 June 1983, the Commission 
was again instructed to consider the problem of MCAs and to make appropriate 
proposals in accordance with the fundamental principles of the CAP and the 
objectives of Article 39 of the EEC Treaty 1• It is these proposals that 
v. 
36. 
are examined in this report. 
THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS 
The Commission's MCA proposals comprise three groups of measures which we 
shall analyse briefly. 
1 Bulletin of the European Communities No. 6 - 1983, p. 21 
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37. 
A. Disman ling MCAs by adapting representative rates <aligning green rates 
to cen ral rates> 
• i • The Comm1Ss1on proposes: 
- dismantling !!i!!iOS-~~!! and their neutral margins in two stages 
beginni g of the marketing years following entry. into force of the 
regulat on; 
at the 
- dismant~ing 0!~-!~!! created after the regulation enters into force; 
dismantling would take place in three equal stages: the first when the 
central rates are realigned and the other two at the beginning of the 
followi~g two marketing years. 
38. These rulfs apply to fixed and variable (both positive and negative> MCAs 
in the sate way and at the same time. 
I • Variable MCAs however depend essent1ally on changes in the market rates and 
may thus ~e created even if the central rates are not realigned; provision 
is thus m!de for dismantling in two stages, at the beginning of the two 
marketing years following their creation when there is no realignment of 
the centr l rates and the general scheme cannot function. 
39. Lastly, a$ adjustments in the green rate may lead to lower incomes in 
I 
countrieslwith strong currencies, the Member 
degressiv+ off-setting aids for a .aximum of 
Communitylfinancial contribution may be made 
States concerned may grant 
three marketing years. A 
following a Council decision. 
B. Chane in the 'neutral mar in', 'non-cumulation' and 'de minimis' rules 
40. Neutral margins were introduced in 1974 in order to reduce the. impact of 
MCAs. Injthe case of basic products for which a strict intervention system 
exists Cc~reals, butter, milk powder, sugar>, the ComMission proposes th'.t 
the preseJt system be maintained whereby the neutral margin for positive 
' . 
41. 
MCAs is 1 'point and.for negative MCAs 1.5 points • 
In the ca,e 
less stri1t 
I 
. · 
of other basic producti·for which the intervention system is 
<e.g. wine) or theoretical Cpigmeat), the Commission has made 
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provision for special measures, which are discussed in getai l below. For 
processed products which are increasingly affected by processing costs but 
only to a limited extent by the cost of the basic product, the Commission 
proposes applying a neutral margin of up to 2 points, but this should in 
no way disrupt trade. 
42. The 'de minimis' rule, which was introduced to prevent over-frequent changes 
in the MCAs, has the same effect as a neutral margin. It provides that MCAs 
should not be changed unless there has been a change of at least 1 point. 
The Commission proposes that this rule be maintained and, for the sake of 
administrative simplification, that where MCAs are minimal (for instance 
0.5 ECU/100 kg for basic products and 1 ECU/100 kg for processed products), 
they should not be applied. 
43. This rule provided that a percentage of 1 should be applied as long as, 
after deduction of 1 or 1.5 points as the case may be, the result obtained 
is less than 1.1 and more than 0. Apart from being very complicated, this 
rule has resulted in an unfortunate situation where MCAs are automatically 
reintroduced without any opportunity being given to await confirmation of 
a trend in a currency. The Commission therefore proposes that it be dis-
continued. 
c. Rules of calculation, by sector 
44. Only small changes are proposed as regards basic products for which a 
~!ti£!_io!~t~~o!i20-~~~!!m exists. 
The system for calculating MCAs in the cereals sector has not been changed. 
For sugar, the only change proposed is that the storage levy be disregarded 
in the calculations; in the milk products sector, the only changes envisaged 
are aimed at totally excluding processing costs from the calculationsfor 
derived products and, possibly, changing the derivation coefficients after 
careful consideration. 
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45. As regard~ basic products for which the iD!~!~~Q!i2Q_§~!!~m is 1~!!_!!!iE! 
Q!_!h£2!£ri£!!, the comoission has reached the following conclusions: 
I 
46. A 'contraction' system has been applied in the wine sector since 1979. This 
means th1t in wine-producing countries with negative MCAs, the MCA applied 
is the highest MCA minus the lowest MCA. Initially, there was little diffi-
culty in !applying this rule, since only two Member States, France and Italy, 
were invqlved. The situation changed with the accession of Greece, a wine-
producin~ country. The system had to be suspended whenever, in a Member 
State coAcerned, the MCA was 0; this measure, needed to ensure equal con-
ditions,lhas been adopted until the end of 1983. 
When con~raction is applied, changes have become very frequent because of 
the existence of three producer states. The rates may vary widely in a 
Member S~ate without any change in the value of its currency, an irrational 
consequence. For these reasons, the contraction system will have to be 
discontihued. 
47. Instead,) the Commission proposes that: 
48. 
the ·~uaranteed minimum price', which is equal to 82% of the guide price, 
be maintained as the basis for calculating MCAs, and 
I 
the n~utral margin be increased from 1 or 1.5 points to 5 points for both 
negative and positive MCAs. Taking present levels as a basis, this would 
lead to elimination of the 2.2% MCAs in France and the 1.6% MCAs in Greece 
and t~ a reduction in the German MCA, which is currently 9~8%. 
Since t~e market price is below the intervention price in.this sector, the 
Commiss~on proposes that the basis 
ventionl price level) be reduced by 
I 
fi9!!!!!!1 
for calculating the MCAs (i.e. the inter-
15% instead of by 10% as at present. 
49. Although pigmeat has so far been regarded as a basic product, given the 
existence of a system of intervention buying, this facility has hardly ever 
I 
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been used. In calculating MCAs, it thus seems appropriate to regard pig-
meat as a product derived from the cereals that make up the pig fodder 
rather than as a basic product. Taking account of the differences in feed 
-costs, existing MCAs would then be reduced by SOX. This reduction would be 
effected in two stages, the first in January 1983 and the second in November 
1984, when the theoretical intervention system existing in the pigmeat sec-
tor is abolished. 
50. The change envisaged in the system for calculating MCAs in this sector 
concerns the fodder ration. 
51. The MCAs for non-Annex II products are calculated on the basis of the MCAs 
for the basic products incorporated in them, using certain coefficients. 
Three qualifiers are already applied: 
- flat-rate reduction of 10% on· all MCAs; 
-no MCAs are applicable if their impact in relation to the market price 
is less than 2.5%; the MCA is reintroduced if the impact exceeds 3X; 
- no MCAs if the equ-ivalent value in ECU does not exceed 1 ECU. 
There seems to be no case for changing the system, except to increase the 
neutral margin by one point, as for all the other derived products. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSALS 
52. The Commission's proposals have already been the subject of preliminary 
discussions within the various Community bodies. These may be summarized 
as follows: 
<a> QQ£~m~n!_fr2m_!n~_§r~~~-er~!i2~ns~_et~!~n!~2-!!_!b~_!e!£i!1-~§!~!!9!£! 
~!D9!!!~-~2YD£i1_Qf_2L1QL11-~2~!m~!t-12§~_in_!!b!D! 
The document prepared by the Greek Presidency proposes that the ~~i!!ing 
~£!!be totally dismantled by the 1987/88 marketing year <i.e. in 4 1/2 
years>, with a third to be dismantled by the start of the 1984/85 
marketing year. 
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(b) 
This document e~dorses the modifications proposed by the Commission to 
the calculatio~ methods and supports facilities for granting degressive 
aid for the farmers affected. 
For 
the 
are 
and 
n~~-~~~~, 1arm prices expressed in ECU should be increased by 2/3 of 
highest revaluation figures whenever the central rates of a currency 
realigned tithin the EMS; the MCAs should then offset the difference 
progressively disappear. 
! 
I 
! 
er2QQ~~!-~~~mip~9_2~_1b~-~2mmi~~i2n_io_£Q~i§~l-2QQ_fio~1-fgr_~~~eiog 
iY~1-0~9~1i~~-~~~~L-2~~~Q_QQ_~-§~!ID~O-Q!QQQ~~! 
The MCAs woulJ be calculated by reference to the green rate of the 
strongest cur~ency. The results at the time of transition would be 
- no change i~ the price level in national currency, since there 
would be no,change in green rates, 
- the disappe~rance of all positive MCAs, 
- the applicafion of negative MCAs for all Member 
that with t~e strongest currency, for which the 
States other than 
MCA would be zero. 
The Commissiol rejected this proposal in the end. 
<c> Ib~-~YrQe~~o1e2r!i2m~o1~~-r~~QQO~~-!Q_£Q~i§~l-2QQ_fio2i_i8~~2iY!iQ0_2f 1§_~Q~~m2~r_1~§~_:_£Y88l_r~e2r!_:_Q2£~_1:2§ZL§~l 
i 
The European 'Parliament believes that the elimination of monetary 
compensatory !amounts is indispensable to the achievement of a genuine 
open market and common prices and that a decision should be taken to 
' dismantle th1se MCAs as quickly as possible, at the most within three 
years, witho~any reduction in farmers' earnings; future realignments 
could be mad~ by introducing negative MCAs instead of new positive MCAs, 
for negative/MCAs 
rates. 
may be more easily eliminated by readjusting the green 
Parliament also considers that no permanent solution to these currency 
problems is possible unless the Community develops a true economic and 
monetary unipn. 
I 
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<A> Dismantling of existing MCAs 
53. Without calling into question the principle of dismantling MCAs, it is 
however easier in practice to dismantle MCAs if they are negative rather 
than positive since, in the latter case, it is farmers' incomes expressed 
in national currencies that fall. However, when we look at the indices of 
gross added value at market price or the trend in the 'cost-price squeeze' 
we can see that the trend in Germany is similar to that in the other 
Community countries. 
54. This means that dismantling MCAs in strong currency countries does not have 
such an adverse effect as might be supposed since belonging to a country 
with a strong currency leads to advantages as regards import prices. We 
need only mention machines, fertilizers and feedingstuffs. 
55. It must be admitted that Germany has made a special effort to dismantle 
its MCAs; since 1969, the German Mark has been considerably revalued whereas 
the German MCA is currently at 9.8%. This picture, which is often painted 
by German Ministers for Agriculture, should not however blind us to the 
fact that for at least ten years Germany has received a bonus of 10% on 
average on the prices paid to its farmers. 
56. This situation is not without its economic repercussions. Either slightly 
outmoded agricultural structures can be maintained or the most efficient 
farms can be further modernized. Moreover, as we said above, it allows 
the agri-foodstuffs sector to pursue an efficient export policy while pro-
tecting itself from imports from other Member States. 
~1~ The way in which MCAs have been dismantled so far, i.e. in conjunction 
with the fixing of agricultural prices in order to prevent a loss of 
earnings for German farmers, has been too slow to permit their complete 
abolition since, in the interval, monetary movements have created new 
MCAs. On the other hand, it would hardly be.reasonable to blame the 
strong currency countries for trying to curb inflation. 
In any event, farmers in these countries should not be penalized by such 
a situation. 
- 26 - PE 87.601 /fin. 
58. The appr,ach adopted by the Commission, aiming for the abolition of existing 
positive MCAs within two years on condition that the farmers in the countrie! 
concerne~ do not suffer a drop in income - taking into account the rise in tt 
price o(ECU which, this year, islikelyto-beparficular.~ylow- was finally 
chosen bf the Committee on Agriculture as the best solution. 
59. 
The dead~ine proposed by the Greek Presidency is, however, too tong to be 
effective in practice. 
I For Germany, this would involve a reduction in its MCAs by 3.2% in the first 
year, anr by 2.1% thereafter. It would unquestionably be better to achieve 
faster reduction by employing the degressive aids provided for in the 
Commissipn's proposal. 
I As to th1 possibility of granting aid to farmers in the cOU"'tries coocemed to 
compensate for loss of income, the Commission's proposal appears to be fair 
providedithat such aid is indeed degressive and stops at the appointed time. 
I 
A negati~e experience in the past calls for a firm stand on this point. 
60. In 1969, !Germany had a positive MCA of 9.3%, which was abolished on 
31 December of the same year. However, under Regulation CEEC) No. 2364/69, 
the Coun~il allowed Germany to grant its producers aid amounting to 
OM 1,700 m for 1970 to 1973, to compensate for loss of income due to the 
abolitio~ of this MCA. At the same time, the Community decided to reimburse 
Germany, through the EAGGF, for some of the aid granted - 90 million u.a. 
I 
in 1970,160 million u.a. in 1971 and 30 miltion u.a. in 1972. 
Germany granted this aid to producers in the form of a reduction of 3% in 
the rate of VAT on farm products and in the form of direct aid on a hectare 
basis CD~ 920 m in 1970, OM 934 m in 1971 and OM 793.5 m in 1972>. 
In 1973, ~he Council decided that the direct hectare aid would have to be 
abolished. It also authorized Germany to phase out the VAT reduction on 
farm prod~cts. In 1976, the reduction was cut to 2.25%, in 1977 to 1.50% 
I 
and in 19~8 to 0.75%, with a return to normal in 1979. 
'I 
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German producers therefore benefited from special conditions for nine years 
instead of four years, as originally planned. The recurrence of such a 
situation should be avoided. 
61. The proposal for Colllln.Unity participation in financing degressive aids is 
balanced in that Germany - since it is the country essentially involved -
would make sacrifices wher-eas its partners would show financial solidarity 
for the most difficult period in the implementation of Colftllluntiy provisions 
to dismantle MCAs. 
It is premature however to make any definitive pronouncement on this matter 
so long as the Commission has not submitted a concrete proposal and has not 
evaluated the cost of such an operation. 
62. Once the problem of existing MCAs has been settled, it should be easier to 
dismantle any new MCAs created in accordance with the timetable drawn up by 
the Commission. 
(8) Dismantling of new MCAs 
63. Generally speaking, no Member State really wcnts fti:As to be autanatically dis-
mantled as soon as they are created, countries with positive MCAs for the 
above reasons and countries with negative MCAs so that they can keep con-
trol of the national rate of inflation. Each Member State quite legitimately 
wants to keep some margin of manoeuvre. On the other hand, they must for 
the sake of the Community accept the timetable for abolition proposed by 
the Commission, it being understood that ·they can always ask fur their 
MCAs to be dismantled more quickly. 
64. In view of the importance of this subject, it wouldbe useful to evaluate 
the advantages and disadvantages of the various proposals currently under 
discussion. 
65. The inflationary impact of the current method of calculating MCAs and that 
of the method advocated by Germany <'green ECU system') may be compared on 
a qualitative basis. 
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1 
A. Curre~t method 
' 
The c~rrent method of calculating MCAs is based on the ECU central rates 
<fixep MCAs) and market rates <variable MCAs). 
I 
If the central rates are altered, the MCAs created as a result mainly 
I 
appl~ to the revalued or devalued currency. As a result of the basket 
effe~t, however, part of the revaluation of a particular currency is 
redi~tributed among the other basket currencies. The extent of this 
redistribution is determined by the weight of the revalued currency in 
the dasket. 
I 
The Higher negative MCAs created by this redistribution require farm 
I 
price adjustments in national currencies to be relatively higher than 
would be necessary without this redistribution. 
<2> £fY_Jrif~-~!!~£1 
SincJ the dismantling of positive MCAs is only possible1 if the result-
ing drop in national currency prices is compensated by price increases 
in e¢u, Community price increases have always taken this factor into 
I 
accotnt. Both in the farm price proposals and especially in the Council' 
fina price decisions the level of ECU increases has allowed for the 
negajive price impact of the dismantling of positive MCAs. Without the 
need,to dismantle positive MCAs, the increases in the Community price 
level in ECU would have been lower. 
<3> Ime!f1-2!_!n~_2i!m!o11ios_g!_o!s!!i~!-~£~! 
So frr, no strict ruleshave been laid down for dismantling negative 
MCAs so the countries concerned have been able to start dismantling 
regardless of the domestic economic situation, which may reinforce the 
infl~tionary trend in their countries. 
In the past~ on the basis of the gentlemen's agreement; in view of the 
discussion bn this point, future policy must be based on the same (political) 
principles.
1 
I 
I 
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< 1 > !H:L~!f~£1 
The calculation of MCAs would be based on the strongest currency, 
currently the OM. 
Instead of being partly redistributed, the effect of the revaluation 
of the DM would be passed on in full to the other currencies. The 
size of national farm price adjustments would accordingly be larger, 
resulting in increased inflationary pressure in these countries. 
As there would no longer be any need to dismantle positive MCAs, the 
annual price increases in ECU would be lower, which would curb inflation. 
Furthermore the changeover to a green ECU system would mean that the 
Community price level would rise compared with the world market price 
level, in line with the revaluation effect of the DM. This rise would, 
amongst other things, lead to increased levies and refunds. This 
'price effect' would undoubtedly have an additional disinflationary 
impact on ann~al price increases in ECU, but would not have any impact 
on the internal market. 
Stricter rules for dismantling negative MCAs -one aim of the Commission's 
proposals - would enable such action to be better coordinated with 
national economic developments and policies, in order to avoid the 
inflationary effects of ad hoc green rate devaluations~ 
66. It is clear that the ECU would lose a great deal of its importance in such 
a system, precisely at a moment when it is called upon to play a greater 
role within the community. The CAP would then be decoupled from the 
European Monetary System, which would be in flagrant contradiction with 
all the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament on this subject. 
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An additional problem is posed by the floating currencies, which would 
be difficult to integrate within the 'German system•, particularly the 
Pound Sterling, which could from time to time be stronger than the German 
Mark. Could a floating currency then be used as the reference currency? 
This is a question worth asking. 
Moreover, there are currently three different rates for the •green• German 
Mark (milk, cereals, other products). Would this mean three different MCA 
percentages for the other countries? 
67. In the case of negative MCAs, exporters may obtain credit for the negative 
MCAs before receiving payment for the exported goods. Importers on the 
other hand sometimes have to wait up to two months before receiving the 
negative MCAs. 
The entire administrative and financial burden of these operations therefore 
falls on those countries with negative MCAs, which represents a considerable 
handicap for these countries. 
68. Adopting the German solution would freeze the gap of about 10% between the 
green rate and the central rate of the German Mark within the EMS. 
In budgetary terms, the result would be an increase in the cost of this 
dual rate every time negative MCAs were reduced, but it should be emphasized 
that this solution would not be more expensive than measures under the 
current system to increase ECU farm prices to a sufficient level to prevent 
a drop in the earnings of German farmers as a result of the abolition of 
positive MCAs. 
69. The advantage of the German proposal is that it resolves the problem of 
positive MCAs, but it also involves a number of serious disadvantages, 
particularly in monetary, budgetary and administrative terms. 
Even though the Commission's proposal appears to be more fair and realistic, 
it nevertheless poses a serious political problem given the negative 
attitude of Germany on this point. 
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A compromise should therefore be found, though it should keep the time-
table for dismantling advocated by the Commission. 
(C) Oth~r modifications proposed by the Commission 
70. The Commission proposes a number of technical modifications designed to 
reduce the economic im~act of MCAs on various sectors <see Chapter V above>. 
Some comments may be made on the proposals for the pigmeat and poultry 
sectors. 
71. Since the Commission proposes the abolition of the more or less theoretical 
intervention system (interventions in the pigmeat sector are minimal), the 
next step could be to abolish the basic price, which is used to determine 
the intervention price. The basic price is however important for initiating 
the intervention measures to aid private storage, a step which the Commission 
may decide to take when market prices reach 103% of the basic price. We must 
not underestimate the likelihood of this action particularly if market prices 
w~re to fall to a very Low Level. In that case, there would no longer be a 
political basis for taking a decision. This must be avoided. 
72. It is important to note that the feed processing coefficient is also used 
to calculate the Levy on imports from third countries. The proposed modifi-
cation would reduce the Level of protection against third countries. A 
different proposal aims to maintain this protection by increasing the flat-
rate amounts for calculating the sluice-gate price. 
In any event, the refunds need to be adjusted more rapidly and brought 
into Line with the calculated rates, which are now Lower as a result of 
the reduction in the feed processing coefficient. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
73. This report has tried to illustrate the adverse economic effects of MCAs, 
which were originally devised· to enable the common agricultural market 
to function smoothly in the Member States. 
However undesirable MCAs may be, they are nevertheless solely the con-
sequence of the Laek of genuine economic and monetary union between the 
Member States. 
74. Monetary union i~ slowly being achieved by means of the EMS, but the 
United Kingdom and Greece still have to participate in it. The United 
Kingdom has shown how one country whose currency is not Linked to the 
others can move from very negative MCAs to positive MCAs. 
Before a common monetary policy can be implemented, interest rates must 
be harmonized, monetary reserves pooled and perhaps a common central bank 
created. 
75. A currency however is never more than the reflection of a country's economic 
situation, and the economic situation varies widely from one Member State 
to another; some have a quasi-structural inflation and others 'quasi-chronic' 
stability. This depends not only on production structures but on social 
structures and a variety of other factors too numerous to mention. 
Economic union is far from being attained. Apart from VAT differences and 
market sharing (e.g. car dealers), there are many technical obstacles 
to trade that prevent attainment of the common market. 
76. Unless more progress is made towards European integration, there will 
always be monetary divergences between the Member States of the Community 
and thus new MCAs since agricultural prices are expressed in ECU. The 
Committee on Agriculture is therefore in favour of a mechanism for dis-
mantling MCAs in accordance with a specific timetable so that there can 
be a genuine common market in the agricultural sphere at Least. 
77. On the other hand, if MCAs are to become a permanent feature, as is the 
case mainly for countries with positive MCAs, markets will become compart-
mentalized and there will be a veiled renationalization of the CAP, which 
is unacceptable. 
- 33 - PE 87.601/fin. 
1. COMC83) 586 final is a Commission report on the rules for calculating 
monetary compensatory amounts <MCAs), as requested by the Council when 
fixing the agricultural prices for 1983: it also contains the proposals for 
regulations which present the report's conclusions in the form of amendments 
to existing regulations. One of the proposals for a regulation deals with the 
gradual dismantling of MCAs. 
The Commission document contains four proposals for regulations. 
A. A regulation amending Regulation <EEC) No. 974/71 in particular in respect 
of the system of neutral margins and the gradual dismantlement of the 
monetary compensatory amounts 
2. This is by far the most important proposal for a regulation in this 
document, adding to Regulation (EEC) No. 974/71 a new Article 5<a> on the 
phasing-out of monetary compensatory amounts by means of adjustments to the 
representative, or "green", rates. As already stated in the general document 
COM<83) 500 <Common Agricultural Policy - Proposals of the Commission>, 
existing MCAs would be dismantled in two equal stages at the beginning of the 
first and second marketing years following the entry into force of the 
regulation. Any new MCAs introduced as a result of currency events would be 
eliminated in three stages: one-third immediately (by means of a corresponding 
adjustment of the relevant representative rates) and the remainder in two 
equal stages <at the beginning of each of the next two marketing years). 
Variable MCAs might develop as a result of a change in market rates, without 
a subsequent adjustment of central rates. MCAs would then have to be dis-
mantled in two stages: at the beginning of the fitst and second years following 
the introduction of the amounts concerned. The adjusted "green" rate and the 
date on which this rate is to take effect would have to be determined at the 
same time in the case of market organizations for which marketing years do 
not apply. The possibility of speeding up the elimination of MCAs, following 
a decision by the Council, is provided for. 
3. Adjustment of the "green" rates, with a view to eliminating MCAs, may 
Lead to reductions in prices, expressed in national currencies, and therefore 
to Loss of income. In paragraph 4 of Article 5<a> it is proposed that, in this 
instance, Member States be authorized to grant offsetting aids. Such aids 
- 36 - PE 87.601/fin. 
would have to be degressive; under no circumstances could they exceed the 
degree of Loss of income, and they could be granted for no more than three 
marketing years. This would enable positive-MeA countries to absorb the 
effects of the dismantling of MCAs over a number of years. 
4. The Committee on Budgets is of the opinion that these proposals are 
compatible with the position taken by the European Parliament in paragraph 22 
of its resolution of 18 November 1983 on the Communication from the Commission 
of the European Communities to the Council on the Common Agricultural Policy -
proposals of the Commission: 
"Believes that ••• a decision should be taken to dismantle these 
MCAs as quickly as possible, at the most within three years, without 
any reduction in farmers' earnings;". 
5. At the beginning of Article S<a>, it is proposed that adjustments of the 
representative rates should be made under the procedure provided for in 
Article 6, which is the Management Committee procedure. Does this procedure 
not run counter to the automatic nature of the MeA-dismantling process? 
6. The other articles of this regulation are more concerned with technical 
aspects, such as the arrangements for pigmeat, which is gradually to be 
transferred from the system of basic products to that of derived products, and 
the neutral margin arrangements (franchises), some of which are to be discon-
tinued while others are to be increased. 
7. The financial implications of these measures are considerable <see 
separate document COM(83) 635 final): 
Dismantling of MCAs: 
diminution of expenditure 
diminution of receipts 
net diminution 
Changes in the neutral margins and in 
the method of calculation of the MCAs: 
diminution of expenditure 
diminution of receipts 
net diminution 
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226 m ECU 
4 m ECU 
222 m ECU 
153 m ECU 
64 m ECU 
88 m ECU 
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B. A regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No. 652/79 on the impact of the 
European Monetary System on the Common Agricultural Policy 
7. Parliament has already delivered an opinion on this proposal for a 
regulation on the basis of a report drawn up by Mr Pol MARCK on behalf of 
the Committee on Agriculture <Doc. 1-1139/83) <resolution of 16 December 1983). 
c. A regulation amending Regulation <EEC) No. 2773/75 laying down rules 
for calculating the levy and the sluice-gate price for eggs 
A regulation amending Regulation CEEC) No. 2778/75 laying down rules for 
calculating the levy and the sluice-gate price for poultrymeat 
8. In the egg and poultrymeat sectors, the common market organization chiefly 
consists of a system of levies and sluice-gate prices that are calculated on 
the basis of the quantity of feed grain required for the production of one 
kilogram of eggs or poultrymeat and on the basis of other production and 
marketing overheads. Advances in production techniques and in marketing and 
changes in production, processing and marketing costs in recent years, have 
in fact brought basic changes in these factors. The Commission now proposes 
to make a corresponding adjustment to the components used to calculate the 
levy and the sluice-gate price, but nowhere does it mention the financial 
implications of these proposals <though at first sight they do not appear 
to be considerable). 
9. The draftsman would like to take this opportunity to clear up a consti-
tutional misunderstanding that, to judge from the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying each proposal for a regulation, holds sway in the Commission. 
The last sentence of the final paragra~h of the memorandum is as follows: 
"By adopting these proposals the Member States would highlight 
their desire to ensure that Community rules are in harmony with 
present-day technical and marketing aspects of this agricultural 
production sector." 
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The draftsman was under the impression that the Common Agricultural Policy 
was a matter for the Community rather than an intergovernmental concern. 
CONCLUSION 
10. The Committee on Budgets endorses all the regulations proposed in 
COM<83> 586 final, provided that it is demonstrated that 
intervention by the Management Committees to adjust the representative 
rates (in the context of the dismantling of MCAs) cannot interfere with 
the automatic nature of this dismantling process, and that 
altering the rules for calculating the levy and the sluice-gate price for 
eggs and poultrymeat will not entail additional expenditure for the 
Community. 
11. The Committee on Budgets points out that the Member States are supposed to 
be bringing their economic and monetary policies into line with each other 
and that this is the only way of avoiding excessive fluctuations in exchange 
parities and the related monetary compensatory amounts. 
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